Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits Eligibility for Probation or Parole Release
This article addresses the impact of Alleyne v. United States 1 on state statutes that restrict an offender's eligibility for release on parole or probation. Alleyne is the latest of several Supreme Court cases applying the rule announced in the Court's 2000 decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey.
2 In Apprendi the Court held that the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury any fact (other than prior conviction) that permits the judge to impose a higher maximum sentence. For thirteen years, the Court used this ceiling-raising metric each time it applied its rule to a new context. In Alleyne, the Court modified that principle, and declared that the Apprendi rule not only applies to findings that permit a higher maximum sentence, but also applies to findings that mandate a higher minimum sentence. Because federal law required that the judge in Alleyne's case impose a sentence of no less than seven years' incarceration for the crime of ''using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence'' if Alleyne had ''brandished'' a firearm, Alleyne had a right to seek a jury's determination of that aggravating fact.
To apply Alleyne, courts must for the first time determine what constitutes a minimum sentence and when that minimum is mandatory. These questions have proven challenging for judges in states that authorize indeterminate sentences (subject to discretionary release on parole) and have statutes that delay the timing of eligibility for release based upon judicial findings at sentencing. Alleyne also raises similar questions, in both determinate and indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions, for statutes that deny or restrict the option of imposing probation or a suspended sentence instead of incarceration upon judicial fact finding. Disagreement about Alleyne's application is understandable; extending Alleyne to findings that alter eligibility for release has the potential to disrupt significantly the sentencing systems in several states.
In this Article, we argue that Alleyne invalidates any state statute that, upon a judicial finding of fact at sentencing (other than prior conviction), requires a judge to delay or deny eligibility for release on probation or parole. The floor of the sentencing range for an indeterminate sentence is the period of incarceration the offender must serve before he can be considered for release on parole. In states such as Michigan and Pennsylvania, statutes that require the judge to impose a longer term prior to eligibility once certain facts are found operate just like the statute in Alleyne, increasing the minimum sentence. Precluding probation based on a judicially found fact also raises the floor of the penalty range under Alleyne, aggravating it from a noncustodial sentence to incarceration.
Alleyne's threat to existing statutes varies by state. Some states will avoid the problem entirely. Arkansas, Mississippi, and New York, for example, can essentially ignore Alleyne because statutes that delay or deny parole or probation eligibility apply to every defendant convicted of specified offenses; no additional factfinding (with the exception of prior conviction 3 ) must occur at sentencing before those minimum sentences apply. A number of other states, including California, Colorado, Hawaii, and West Virginia, do have statutes restricting eligibility for release on parole or probation upon judicial findings of particular facts, but will escape post-Alleyne challenges to these particular statutes because state law already requires juries to decide those facts. Presently, however, sixteen statesAlaska, Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-have one or more statutory provisions that limit either parole or probation eligibility based on additional judicial findings at sentencing, provisions we argue are unconstitutional after Alleyne. This count of affected states would have included Kansas as well, but Kansas lawmakers, prompted by a remand from the Supreme Court, 4 swiftly recognized the vulnerability under Alleyne of state statutes limiting parole eligibility for convicted murderers. In an emergency legislative session, they amended the law to require jury findings. 5 Other states have been slower to react. New Jersey's high court has agreed to review the issue. 6 Lower courts in Pennsylvania have admitted Alleyne's probable impact on statutes in that state. 7 By contrast, in Michigan, with a sentencing system built upon minimum parole-eligibility ranges, state courts have confronted and rejected arguments that Alleyne renders the state's sentencing scheme unconstitutional.
Remarkably, although dozens of state laws limiting probation or parole release are unconstitutional after Alleyne, sentencing scholars seem not to have noticed. One explanation for this blind spot may be that much of the academic writing about sentencing focuses on federal law, and federal courts have not yet grappled with this issue.
Federal defendants prosecuted today would not encounter a judge-found parole limitation at sentencing; discretionary release on parole was abolished for federal defendants in the 1980s. 8 As for probation, federal statutes limiting probation eligibility upon a finding of fact other than conviction are rare. 9 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain many such provisions, but they are now advisory. 10 And although Alleyne is a constitutional rule that state defendants are already raising in federal habeas proceedings, as a ''new'' rule it will be available only to those prisoners whose convictions were not yet final in 2013. As a consequence, it may be some time before the lower federal courts address the application of Alleyne to parole and probation eligibility provisions in the states. 11 For the time being, judicial discussion of the issue has been limited to state decisions. This article provides analyses that litigants and judges might find useful as these Alleyne challenges make their way through the courts. It also offers a menu of options for state lawmakers who would prefer to amend their sentencing law proactively in order to minimize disruption of their criminal justice systems.
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I. The Ruling in Alleyne Apprendi v. New Jersey, 13 the source of the rule extended by the Court in Alleyne, grew out of legislative efforts to structure judicial sentencing discretion. Beginning in the 1970s, new statutes tied factfinding at sentencing to higher sentencing ranges. Initially, the Court tolerated this practice. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 14 it held that a defendant's constitutional rights were not violated by a statute that raised the minimum penalty for an offense to five years if the judge found at sentencing that the defendant had a gun, noting that the finding did not change the maximum punishment the judge could impose for that conviction. A finding that raises only the floor of the sentencing range, the Court reasoned, is not an element of the offense, that is, part of the charge that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
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Apprendi involved just the situation distinguished in McMillan-a statute that exposed the defendant to a higher punishment ceiling based on a judicial finding of fact at sentencing. 16 The Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, such a fact must be considered an element of what is essentially an aggravated offense, and that permitting a judge to determine that fact at sentencing deprived the defendant of his right to a jury determination of every element of an offense. Other than the fact of prior conviction, the Court held, ''any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 17 The Court later clarified that when a finding of fact is required to impose a sentence above a binding guideline range, 18 or to impose a higher maximum fine, 19 it falls within the Apprendi rule. Although confirming that the rule in Apprendi applied whenever a fact found by the judge raised the ceiling of a sentencing range, the Court in Harris v. United States 20 declined to overrule McMillan and extend the rule to judicial factfinding that raised the punishment floor. Not until 2013 did a new five-justice majority overrule Harris and McMillan, concluding in Alleyne that ''the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the mandatory minimum. '' 21 Alleyne, like Harris, had been convicted of violating a federal statute that designated a sentence of ''not less than 5 years'' for anyone who ''uses or carries a firearm'' in relation to a ''crime of violence,'' and ''not less than 7 years'' ''if the firearm is brandished. ' Relying on Harris, the judge rejected this argument, found that the government had established brandishing by a preponderance of the evidence, and imposed a sentence of seven years. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in Alleyne, traced the ''linkage of facts with particular sentence ranges (defined by both the minimum and the maximum)'' at common law, and noted ''a well-established practice of including in the indictment, and submitting to the jury, every fact that was a basis for imposing or increasing punishment. '' 24 This rule, he explained, allowed the defendant to predict the judgment, if convicted, from the face of the indictment. A ''fact increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of the offense,'' he wrote. ''Elevating the low-end of a sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with the crime: the defendant's 'expected punishment has increased as a result of the narrowed range' and 'the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he might wish.''' 25 The Sixth Amendment, he explained, ''applies where a finding of fact both alters the legally prescribed range and does so in a way that aggravates the penalty.'' 26 He reiterated that the Constitution's protections, rooted in the common law, ensured that a criminal charge would inform the accused what the punishment will be and that all facts essential to that punishment would be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury before that punishment could be imposed. 27 Justice Breyer, providing the fifth vote, noted in a separate opinion that even though he continued to disagree with Apprendi, he concurred with the Court's decision because it seemed ''highly anomalous to read Apprendi as insisting that juries find sentencing facts that permit a judge to impose a higher sentence while not insisting that juries find sentencing facts that require a judge to impose a higher sentence. The minimum term in Alleyne was clear; the statute stated the sentence as ''not less than 5 years'' or, with brandishing, ''not less than 7 years.'' Alleyne's federal sentence was determinate-that is, the term of incarceration was set at sentencing and not subject to early release by paroling authorities. Federal defendants receive a single sentence and serve that sentence; they are not sentenced to a range within which they might or might not be released depending on decisions by paroling authorities at a later time.
Term Before Release Eligibility as ''Minimum''
Unlike the federal courts, a majority of states continue to impose indeterminate sentences. In these states, where a parole board or other paroling authority retains the option of releasing an offender before the maximum sentence imposed is served, what is the ''minimum'' sentence for purposes of Alleyne? Logically, the minimum, or floor of the sentencing range, is the period of incarceration that must be served before a defendant may first be considered for release. For example, if release is barred until after the offender has served fifty years, then the minimum sentence is fifty years. Many states equate eligibility dates with minimum sentence. 30 The parole eligibility date in a system of discretionary release is just as impermeable a floor as the minimum seven-year term in the determinate sentencing system in Alleyne.
The rule in Alleyne comes into play whenever a more severe or ''aggravated'' minimum sentence is triggered by a factual finding at sentencing. Thus, if a statute requires the judge who finds a specified fact at sentencing to impose a term of incarceration with a release eligibility date that is later than the date that would apply in the absence of that finding, the defendant has a right to a jury determination of that specified fact. By delaying eligibility for release, the finding ''[e]levat[es] the low-end of a sentencing range and heightens the loss of liberty associated with the crime.''
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The same is true if the fact eliminates eligibility for release.
Although some states do not delegate decisions about the timing of parole eligibility to the sentencing judge, 32 many states do expect judges to select the minimum term, and have enacted statutes that require the judge to delay or deny eligibility for release on parole based on a finding of fact at sentencing. All of these statutes are potentially unconstitutional under Alleyne. These provisions include restrictions on release for offenders whose offense occurred while on release for another crime, 33 One difference between the determinate sentence in Alleyne and an indeterminate sentence is that once a federal sentence is served, the offender is always released, but once an offender serving an indeterminate sentence reaches eligibility for parole, he need not be released. One might argue that in an indeterminate system, the minimum sentence is not the earliest eligibility date that the law allows the judge to set, but instead is whatever term the paroling authority later decides the offender must serve. But this would miss the point of the Apprendi/Alleyne line of cases. The Apprendi rule targets statutes that essentially shortcircuit the Bill of Rights requirements of notice and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury by shifting factfinding that determines the sentencing range away from the trial to the sentencing phase. The minimum sentence that matters in Alleyne is the floor of the range available to the sentencing judge, the penalty ''affixed to the crime, '' 42 not the sentence that might actually be served by the offender. That a paroling authority may ultimately decide not to release the defendant when he first becomes eligible is irrelevant. What is crucial is that the legislature has narrowed the penalty range available to the trial judge once the specified fact is determined. Similarly, because Alleyne is concerned only with factfinding that legislatures have given to judges rather than juries, delays in release eligibility that result from the decisions of corrections officials made after initial sentencing, even when such decisions depend upon findings of fact, are not affected by Alleyne. 
Rebutting Opposing Arguments
To oppose the characterization of eligibility restrictions as minimum sentences, we anticipate states will raise three arguments, drawing from the reasoning in the Court's Apprendi cases. a. Lack of Historical Basis. First, states may argue that both parole and probation are relatively modern inventions, lacking the historical pedigree of the graded terms of incarceration that appeared in early American criminal codes. Decisions affecting eligibility for parole or probation would have been completely unknown in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Discretionary parole release and the option of using community supervision in lieu of incarceration swept the nation only in the early twentieth century. 56 If the meaning of the Sixth Amendment's Jury
Clause is limited to the historical context surrounding its adoption, then it may not regulate factfinding that alters eligibility for probation or parole. 57 Indeed, Justice Thomas, the author of Alleyne, has been one of the most consistent voices on the Court for adherence to historical context in interpreting the Jury Clause.
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The Court did rely upon history to derive its general rule in Apprendi, 59 but it has refused to use history as a litmus test for each and every application of that general rule. Early American criminal codes appeared not to include statutes like the one in Alleyne, for example, that keyed a higher minimum sentence to a particular fact, but did not at the same time raise the maximum sentence. 60 Sentencing guidelines like those in Blakely or Booker were also creatures of the late twentieth century, but this novelty did not exempt them from the Apprendi rule either. As Justice Thomas explained in his dissent in Harris, ''The Court has not previously suggested that constitutional protection ends where legislative innovation or ingenuity begins. Looking to the principles that animated the decision in Apprendi and the bases for the historical practice upon which Apprendi rested (rather than to the historical pedigree of mandatory minimums), there are no logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory minimums any differently than facts that increase the statutory maximum. '' 61 Justice Breyer, providing the fifth vote in Alleyne, agreed the application of Apprendi to mandatory minimum statutes was compelled by ''principle'' and ''logic.'' He found it ''highly anomalous to read Apprendi as insisting that juries find sentencing facts that permit a judge to impose a higher sentence while not insisting that juries find sentencing facts that require a judge to impose a higher sentence. '' 62 It would be even more ''anomalous'' to hold that a defendant has a right to a jury determination of a fact that raises the penalty floor for his crime from five to seven years, but not if it raises the floor from life with the possibility of parole after 20 years to life without the possibility of parole. In both circumstances the defendant is unable to predict the legally authorized penalty range ''from the face of the felony.'' 63 b. Disruption and Prejudice. Another potential objection to the application of Alleyne to factfinding that alters parole and probation eligibility is the practical difficulty states may face if they were required to implement the jury right in this context. Accommodating Alleyne could require the abandonment of appellate oversight of formerly enforceable limits on judicial sentencing discretion, or the injection of additional, possibly prejudicial, factfinding into jury trials. But this argument, like the historical claim, is unlikely to succeed in defeating what is otherwise a principled application of the Apprendi rule. In Alleyne, Booker, Blakely, Southern Union, Cunningham, and Apprendi itself, advocates opposing the rule have described a similar ''parade of horribles,'' but the Court, as Justice Scalia has observed, has repeatedly watched that parade pass by without ''salut [ing] . '' 64 c. Probation and Parole as Mitigated Penalties. A final argument against applying Alleyne in this context is that a judicial decision to permit release rather than incarceration mitigates the penalty that would otherwise apply, and Apprendi does not apply to factfinding that mitigates the legally prescribed range of punishment. 65 The statutes collected here, however, do not involve factfinding that mitigates the penalty. Certainly some state statutes that regulate when a judge may impose a sentence of probation or a suspended sentence do designate incarceration as the presumptive sentence, and then assign to the defendant the burden of proving at sentencing those facts required for probation eligibility. If a statute is set up this way, the judge's determination of those facts at sentencing does not aggravate the penalty range. Rather, incarceration is already within the range of penalties prior to the judge's factfinding; that factfinding only mitigates or lowers the floor of the range. 66 But the probation statutes that violate Alleyne are not set up this way. Instead, they authorize either probation or incarceration for the offense of conviction and raise the penalty floor to incarceration, eliminating the probation option, upon a finding of fact at sentencing. 67 Probation may have originated as a form of judicial clemency-mercy that a court could dispense at its discretion to soften the punishment of what would otherwise always be incarceration. But once a legislature expressly denies the opportunity for probation in cases in which a particular fact is established at sentencing, it has removed the judge's discretion to dispense that leniency. By permitting probation in all cases except those in which the fact is established, the legislature has created two separate penalty ranges, one more aggravated than the other. In the words of Alleyne, ''the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury.''
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The same can be said for statutes that regulate a judge's authority to set the minimum term an offender must serve before becoming eligible for release on parole. Through the 1970s, in states that granted judges the discretion to select a minimum eligibility date at sentencing, accelerating that date may have been a discretionary act of leniency. Today, if a statute permits a judge upon finding certain facts at sentencing to impose a minimum term that is even lower than a presumptive minimum term, neither Apprendi nor Alleyne requires a jury to determine those facts; that factfinding does indeed mitigate the range. 69 But once a legislature requires a judge to delay the date of eligibility for release in cases in which a designated fact is established at sentencing, the legislature has created two separate penalty ranges, one for cases without that fact, and another, more aggravated range for cases with that fact. The Court in Alleyne limited its stated rule to factfinding that triggers more aggravated minimum sentences that are ''mandatory,'' that is, factfinding that ''alters the legally prescribed range.'' Defining what is or is not a mandatory minimum is a new issue introduced by the Alleyne ruling. The meaning of this concept can be derived from the Court's earlier decisions applying the Apprendi rule. The seven-year minimum in Alleyne was mandatory because it was enforceable on appeal. Had a judge refused to impose that sentence and imposed a lesser sentence instead, the government could have secured relief on appeal. 71 In
Booker, the Court rendered the Guidelines ''advisory'' and compliant with the Sixth Amendment, rather than ''mandatory'' and unconstitutional, by invalidating those provisions in the Sentencing Reform Act that permitted the courts of appeals to enforce compliance with those guidelines. It is the potential for reversal on appeal, the Court explained, that makes the sentence mandatory. 72 Thus, the parole and probation disqualification provisions vulnerable under Alleyne are those that are enforceable on appeal, so that if a judge imposed a sentence that allowed release sooner than the statute required, the state could have the sentence overturned. Conversely, if state law grants complete discretion to a trial judge to delay the date of eligibility for release after finding an aggravating fact, then it would not fall within the Alleyne rule, any more than advisory guidelines fall within Blakely.
Importantly, the seven-year minimum sentence in Alleyne was considered a mandatory minimum sentence even though under federal law Alleyne might have earned time off his sentence in ''good'' or ''earned'' time credits, and secure release in less than seven years. The ''legally prescribed'' floor of the range in Alleyne was the seven-year determinate term, despite the possibility that good or earned time would reduce the actual sentence served below seven years. 73 Likewise, the possibility or even probability that good or earned time credits will reduce the period of incarceration required before eligibility for release from an indeterminate sentence does not make the minimum period before eligibility for release any less mandatory.
Alleyne also makes it clear that a minimum term triggered by a judicial finding of fact can be mandatory even when the judge has the option of imposing the same sentence without the challenged factfinding. 74 In Alleyne itself the judge had discretion to impose seven years without finding the defendant had brandished a gun. Put differently, Alleyne controls whenever factfinding raises the floor of the sentencing range even if the ceiling stays the same. Courts rejecting the application of Alleyne to the sentencing system in Michigan appear to have misunderstood this point. Michigan's system uses a sentencing grid that designates, at the intersection of criminal history and offense level scores, a ''recommended'' term of incarceration after which the offender would be eligible for parole. The offense level score is determined by the required combination of a specified set of offense variables, scored by the judge at sentencing. 75 The judge is not permitted to impose an eligibility date earlier than that recommended by the grid, unless he finds a ''substantial and compelling reason'' for doing so, and that finding may be challenged on appeal. 76 The Michigan Court of Appeals has reasoned that this scheme does not implicate Alleyne because the judicial factfinding under the state's guidelines merely ''inform[s] the trial judge's sentencing discretion within the maximum determined by statute and the jury's verdict.'' 77 This conclusion was correct when Harris was in force. But Alleyne overruled Harris; states are no longer free to use judicial factfinding at sentencing to ''inform'' sentencing discretion within the maximum sentence authorized by conviction, when that guidance mandates a higher minimum sentence.
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Nor does the presence of an exception or departure provision that would allow a trial judge to impose a lower minimum sentence in unusual cases make the presumptive minimum term any less ''mandatory.'' Consider the Supreme Court's earlier treatment of the same issue in connection with the range ceiling or maximum sentence, in its decisions in Blakely, Booker, Cunningham, and Gall. The Court has consistently rejected the argument that when a judge is allowed to depart upward from the presumptive sentence, that presumptive sentence is not the ''maximum'' sentence. 79 For example, in Gall, the Court reasoned that if a statute defines a standard or test that must be met in order to depart from the guidelines, the guidelines are still considered mandatory.
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Just as a presumptive maximum sets the ceiling or maximum of a penalty range, regardless of the presence of a departure provision, so a presumptive minimum sets the floor despite the presence of one or more exceptions. There is no basis for treating the effect of a departure provision for the floor of the range any differently. Kansas lawmakers, for example, did not regard the statutory exception thereallowing a lesser term if the judge concludes ''manifest injustice'' would result 81 -as protection from Alleyne's reach. 82 Although Michigan courts refuse to agree, the ''recommended'' term before eligibility under that state's law is the mandatory minimum sentence under Alleyne, even though a judge could impose a shorter term after finding a ''substantial and compelling reason.'' Finally, whenever a statute requires that a trial court must limit eligibility for release once it determines that a certain fact is established, that minimum sentence remains mandatory or ''legally prescribed'' despite the possibility that the defendant may obtain earlier release through clemency. 83 Alleyne himself could theoretically receive clemency at some point, too, but that possibility didn't make his seven-year term less mandatory in the Court's view.
III: Options for Compliance
This section provides guidance for courts and lawmakers in states with statutes that may violate the rule in Alleyne. Steps taken sooner rather than later to correct non-compliant statutes will help reduce the disruption created by Alleyne, minimizing the number of cases in which prisoners will be able to challenge their convictions and sentences. The options for bringing state law into compliance mirror those used by states in the wake of the Court's decision in Blakely. 84 In states where few statutes were implicated by Blakely, the fix was fairly simple; in states where the entire sentencing structure relied on mandatory guideline ranges, more sweeping measures were necessary. In states where only a limited number of statutes include factfinding that restricts probation or parole release, compliance with Alleyne may require minimal legislative effort. For example, isolated statutes could be amended to delete the aggravating fact, or to allow the judge to impose the lesser sentence despite finding the aggravating fact. Or, a legislature could replace existing mandatory minimum sentence enhancements with lesser and greater offenses. If the number of facts triggering mandatory minimum sentences is small, a legislature could add a provision guaranteeing the right to a jury trial for those facts, alongside or after jury trial of the other elements of the offense, a practice already followed in several states. The Kansas legislature, for example, adopted this change for its ''Hard 40'' and ''Hard 50'' statutes, which previously required the judge determine the facts that triggered mandatory minimum sentences of forty or fifty years. The newly enacted statute now gives juries the authority to decide those aggravating factors, and whether there were any mitigating factors to offset such a sentence. It also creates a procedure to empanel new juries if it is necessary to resentence defendants who are already serving hard-40 or hard-50 sentences. 85 For states that rely heavily upon judicial factfinding to set terms that must be served before eligibility for parole release, or to determine eligibility for non-incarceration sentences, it may be unrealistic to amend separately into graded offenses all of the different crimes affected by Alleyne. And treating as an element each of a very large number of factors would create the same sort of challenges that faced the Court in Booker under the Federal Guidelines. Providing for a jury determination of facts implicated by Alleyne may be more manageable after reducing the number of such facts, 86 or allowing defendants to admit or opt for a judicial determination on only those facts implicated by the Apprendi rule while contesting remaining elements (something like a partial plea or partial jury waiver). 87 But the most obvious remedy is the one adopted by the Supreme Court in Booker and by a number of states after Blakely: changing the ''legally prescribed'' ranges to advisory ranges. 88 This may involve invalidating or repealing those aspects of the law that allow appellate courts to enforce adherence to minimum sentences, thereby permitting judges to exercise their discretion to impose lower sentences despite finding aggravating factors at sentencing. States may find the advisory option particularly attractive if non-compliant provisions are littered throughout the code or affect a large volume of cases. Take Michigan as an example. Under the current scheme, the sentencing judge is required to find and score a number of offense variables (OVs) to determine the appropriate guidelines range for a minimum sentence. 89 If the guidelines were advisory, the sentencing court would continue to determine the recommended minimum term before parole eligibility, 90 but would consider the ''guidelines range as an aid,'' not a mandate. 91 Another alternative might be to make the recommended restrictions on release part of the guidelines governing the paroling authority's decision to release rather than part of the judge's sentencing determination. As parole release guidelines, they would not affect the range available to the trial judge at sentencing, escaping challenge under the rule in Apprendi.
Finally, there is another option for coping with Alleyne that we do not recommend. A state could shift the presumptive sentence for an offense up to the highest minimum and reserve lower minimum sentences (i.e., earlier eligibility for release) for those defendants who are able to prove mitigating factors. As previously discussed, several states have probation statutes designed in this way, presuming incarceration and placing the burden on defendants to prove certain facts that would permit probation. But as an option for enforcing tiered levels of parole eligibility based on facts found at sentencing, it makes little policy sense. This system could produce higher pretrial burdens if initial charges carried longer potential sentences, as well as longer sentences of incarceration, thereby raising even further costs that many states are attempting to lower.
IV. Conclusion
The Court's latest extension of the Apprendi rule in Alleyne requires courts for the first time to identify when judicial factfinding mandates a higher minimum sentence. This has proven to be no simple matter when state statutes require judges to delay or deny release on probation or parole depending upon whether specified facts are determined at sentencing. State courts continuing to resist the application of Alleyne to restrictions on release eligibility are fighting a losing battle. A legislature need not abandon efforts to calibrate eligibility for release with factfinding, but it must select a method of doing so that complies with the Constitution. Far more states will be affected by Alleyne if the Court decides to abandon the prior conviction exception to the Apprendi rule. For example, see Tennessee's sentencing structure, where penalty ranges vary depending upon whether the defendant is a standard, multiple, or career offender. See also People v. Griffis, 212 Cal. App. 4th 956, 962-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting the pleading and proof requirement for prior conviction that disqualified the defendant from the option of jail rather than prison, which in turn required ''him to serve his entire term in prison without eligibility for the split-sentence option''). 
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By extending the reach of the rule in Apprendi, Alleyne may also accelerate the need for courts to resolve other difficult questions already raised by the Apprendi rule in other contexts, questions not addressed in this article, including when a finding is one of fact subject to Apprendi rather than law, whether or not the prior conviction ''exception'' should survive, and whether or not facts affected by the rule in Apprendi or Alleyne must be treated like elements for purposes of the Sixth Amendment requirement of notice, double jeopardy, lesser included offense instructions, advice required for a knowing or voluntary guilty plea, or Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis. For discussion of many of these controversies, see Wayne R. Lafave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, and Orin S. Instead, the minimum term after which the defendant will be eligible for parole is a set percentage of the maximum sentence for the offense of conviction or is determined by the underlying offense of conviction and is not subject to modification at sentencing. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.750 (delaying eligibility for parole if the victim of specified pornography offense was younger than fourteen); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9717 (commanding that ''[p]arole shall not be granted until the minimum term of imprisonment has been served,'' upon finding that a defendant convicted of specified offenses was under sixty years of age and ''the victim is over 60 years of age and not a police officer'' (emphasis added)); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9718 (same, victim under sixteen years of age); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3(f) (same, victim of child abuse five years of age or under). 38 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 7 (restricting eligibility upon a judicial finding of whether the offense was ''in retaliation for the defendant being reported . . . for failure to pay child support payments''); Nev. Rev E.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15A-32.1 (providing that for sex offenders, the board may, after a hearing, determine if parole eligibility is to be withheld); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10 (providing that the commissioner of correction may grant an offender temporary release to, for example, attend a family member's funeral or obtain medical services). E.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-26-13.3 (providing that if overcrowding is established, the governor may grant ''emergency good time to nonviolent offenders to expedite eligibility for parole of the minimum number of sentenced offenders to meet the mandated population caps''); Neb. Rev See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-708 (stating a convicted defendant ''shall be sentenced to a term of not less than the presumptive sentence authorized for the offense and the person is not eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon or release from confinement''); State v. Large, 234 Ariz. 274, 321 P.3d 439 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the defendant, sentenced to ''flat time'' under § 13-708 for his robbery because the sentencing judge determined it occurred while he was on parole, ''was entitled to have a jury determine his parole status [at the time he committed the offense of conviction] because that fact exposed him to a penalty beyond the statutory minimum,'' but finding error harmless). See also, e. g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.100 (stating that probation is required for certain crimes unless, at sentencing, the judge finds the person was on probation or parole at the time the felony was committed, the person had previously had probation or parole revoked, or the person failed to successfully complete a rehabilitation program); State v. Albrecht, 790 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Neb. 2010) (holding a convicted defendant was not eligible for probation for driving under the influence (DUI) if that offense was committed while another DUI charge was pending, finding that the ineligibility statute ''does not change the crime or the elements thereof''). hile judicial fact-finding in scoring the sentencing guidelines produces a recommended range for a minimum sentence of an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which is set by law . . . it does not establish a mandatory minimum; therefore, the exercise of judicial discretion guided by the sentencing guidelines scored through judicial fact-finding does not violate due process or the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial.'' (internal quotations and citations omitted)). At least six later decisions in Michigan have followed Herron.
78
So far, only two judges in Michigan have taken this position, agreeing with the defendant in Herron and arguing Herron was wrongly decided. People v. Lockridge, 2014 WL 563648 at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (Beckering, J., concurring) (stating ''the guidelines range within which a sentencing court in Michigan is required to fix a minimum term of imprisonment is itself a legally prescribed mandatory minimum'' and explaining that ''since Michigan's sentencing scheme requires the court to rely upon Offense Variables (''OVs'') to calculate the appropriate guidelines range for a minimum sentence, it is finding facts to determine the sentence range authorized by law''); see also Lockridge, 2014 WL 563648 at *11 (Shapiro, J., concurring 
